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Abstract 
Call the view that it is possible to acquire aesthetic knowledge via testimony, optimism, and 
its denial, pessimism. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for pessimism. It works by 
turning attention away from the basis of the relevant belief, namely, testimony, and toward 
what that belief in turn provides a basis for, namely, other attitudes. In short, I argue that an 
aesthetic belief acquired via testimony cannot provide a rational basis for further attitudes, 
such as admiration, and that the best explanation for this is that the relevant belief is not itself 
rational. If a belief is not rational, it is not knowledge. So, optimism is false. After addressing 
a number of objections to the argument, I consider briefly its bearing on the debate 
concerning thick evaluative concepts. While the aim to argue that pessimism holds, not to 
explain why it holds, I provide an indication in closing of what that explanation might be. 
 
1  Introduction 
As I leave work, I meet someone entering the building. She tells me that it is raining. In 
response, I form the belief that it is raining. In this way, on the basis of testimony, I come to 
know that it is raining. The next day, as I leave work, I meet the same person. She tells me 
that Hockney’s recent portraits are lifeless. In response, I form the belief that Hockney’s 
recent portraits are lifeless. In this way, on the basis of testimony, might I come to know that 
the portraits are lifeless? It is clear that testimony can provide knowledge in cases like the 2 
 
first, but can it do so in cases like the second? More generally, is testimony a source of 
aesthetic knowledge? 
Call the view that one can acquire aesthetic knowledge via testimony, optimism, and 
its denial, pessimism.1 As Robson says, ‘pessimism is more often assumed than argued for’.2 
                                                           
1 This terminology is due to Robert Hopkins, ‘How to Be a Pessimist about Aesthetic Testimony’, Journal of 
Philosophy 108 (2011), 138-157. Hopkins draws a further distinction between unavailability pessimism – 
according to which aesthetic testimony does not make available (is not a source of) aesthetic knowledge – and 
unusability pessimism – according to which aesthetic testimony does make available aesthetic knowledge 
although it is improper to form a belief on its basis. Importantly, the norm according to which the relevant belief 
is improper is aesthetic rather than epistemic, and so its violation is not knowledge-undermining.  
For optimism, see Malcolm Budd, ‘The Acquaintance Principle’, BJA 43 (2003), 386-392; Aaron 
Meskin, ‘Aesthetic Testimony’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004), 65-91; Nick Zangwill, 
‘Two Dogmas of Kantian Aesthetics’, in Richard Woodfield (ed), Proceedings of the 11th International 
Congress in Aesthetics (Nottingham: Nottingham Polytechnic Press, 1990), 1-12. 
For unavailability pessimism, see Robert Hopkins, ‘Beauty and Testimony’, in Anthony O’Hear (ed), 
Philosophy, the Good, the True and the Beautiful (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 209-236; 
Alvin Goldman, ‘The Experiential Account of Aesthetic Value’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 
(2006), 333-342; Philip Pettit, ‘The Possibility of Aesthetic Realism’, in Eva Shaper (ed), Pleasure, Preference 
and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 17-38. 
For unusability pessimism, see Keren Gorodeisky, ‘A New Look at Kant’s View of Aesthetic 
Testimony’, BJA 50 (2010), 53-70; Robert Hopkins, ‘How to Be a Pessimist about Aesthetic Testimony’. For 
critical discussion of unusability pessimism, see Jon Robson, ‘Aesthetic Testimony and the Norms of Belief 
Formation’, European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming). 
Pessimism is usually traced back to Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. C. Meredith 
(Oxford: OUP, 1952), §33. For discussion of Kant’s position, see Hopkins, ‘Beauty and Testimony’; 
Gorodeisky, ‘A New Look at Kant’s View of Aesthetic Testimony’. 
  In this paper, I argue for unavailability pessimism (hereafter, pessimism). I thereby argue against 
unusability pessimism, though for ease of presentation I will focus on the dispute with the optimist.  
2 Jon Robson, ‘Aesthetic Testimony’, Philosophy Compass 7 (2012), 3. 3 
 
In this paper, I try to remedy this situation by developing a novel argument for pessimism, 
one which shifts attention away from the basis for the relevant belief, namely, testimony, and 
towards what that belief in turn provides the basis for, namely, other attitudes. Doing so, I 
suggest, allows us to resolve what can seem like an intractable dispute.3 
 
2  Setting the Stage 
Before introducing the argument, some stage-setting is in order. First, to keep things 
manageable, when discussing cases of aesthetic testimony I focus on those involving 
evaluative, as opposed to deontic, beliefs and claims. So, I do not discuss testimony about 
what aesthetic reasons there are for doing certain things – say, hanging the picture there – or 
about what one aesthetically ought to do – say, remove the stone-cladding. Moreover, I focus 
in the first instance on testimony involving only thin evaluative concepts – such as beauty, 
ugliness, goodness and badness – as opposed to thick concepts – such as gracefulness, 
delightfulness and garishness. Where the thin ends and the thick begins is a thorny issue, one 
I return to (§10).4 
  Second, I focus (until §9) on cases of bare aesthetic testimony, cases in which the 
testifier does no more than assert, say, that the Shard is ugly, without saying anything about 
                                                           
3 The argument might support pessimism about testimony as a source of evaluative knowledge more generally; 
that is, it might count against the idea that one can know that something possesses, say, moral value on the basis 
of testimony. I do not explore the wider consequences of the argument here – there is enough to be getting on 
with. 
4 The view that beauty and ugliness are thin evaluative concepts is often implicit in work in aesthetics. For an 
explicit statement, see Nick Zangwill, ‘Moral Metaphor and Thick Concepts’, in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick 
Concepts (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 197-209. 4 
 
why it is ugly, in what respects it is ugly, what features it has which make it ugly, and so on.5 
The claim that aesthetic knowledge is not possible due to bare testimony remains contentious 
and puzzling; after all, one can clearly gain knowledge concerning non-aesthetic matters via 
bare testimony. For example, one can acquire testimonial knowledge that it is raining, even if 
the testifier says nothing about why it is raining, in what way it is raining, and so on. 
Third, I assume that aesthetic knowledge is possible. The claim I defend is only that it 
is not possible to acquire such knowledge thanks to testimony alone. 
Fourth, I do not assume any particular theory of aesthetic discourse and its subject 
matter. The tendency will be to talk in a realist fashion – that is, to talk as if there are 
aesthetic properties which testimony concerns – but this is consistent with a host of meta-
normative views. I am not tipping the balance in favour of pessimism by proceeding in this 
way; indeed, if some version of realism is true, if there really are aesthetic properties, one 
might expect testimony about when and where those properties are on display to be a 
straightforward matter.  
Fifth, I do not discuss competing accounts of the nature of testimony or of how in 
general it provides knowledge. On some views, a subject acquires testimonial knowledge 
only if she lacks the belief that the testifier is untrustworthy, or the environment is friendly, or 
the testifier is reliable and authoritative, or…. When considering cases of testimony, I assume 
that whatever conditions need to be met for typical cases of non-aesthetic testimony to 
                                                           
5 In addition, I assume that the recipient of the testimony has no independent reason to believe or disbelieve the 
proposition in question, that the testimony is the only available grounds for belief. The recipient might have 
some idea of the kinds of features which, for example, make a building of the relevant sort ugly or beautiful but 
she is not in a position to know whether the building in question actually has or lacks those features. 5 
 
succeed are met.6 Since the focus of my argument is downstream, it will not turn on any 
particular theory of testimony. I take this to be an advantage of the argument. 
Sixth, I do not deny that when a person provides testimony concerning some aesthetic 
matter there is knowledge of a sort that her audience might acquire in a fashion. If Sophie’s 
colleague tells her that the Shard is ugly, she might come to know that her colleague believes 
that the Shard is ugly. But here the knowledge is psychological, not aesthetic; it is also non-
testimonial, since Sophie might have this knowledge while disbelieving the testimony. 
Alternatively, if Sophie’s colleague tells her that the Shard is ugly, she might acquire 
knowledge that the Shard is probably ugly. It is not clear to me that such probabilistic 
knowledge is best thought of as aesthetic; be that as it may, I am not denying that it is 
possible. The claim is only that Sophie cannot come to know via bare testimony that the 
Shard is ugly (full stop). This remains contentious and puzzling; after all, it is clearly possible 
to come to know via bare testimony that it is raining (full stop), not just that it is probably 
raining. 
 
3  Belief as a Basis 
My argument against optimism takes off from the familiar thought that belief provides a basis 
for actions and other attitudes. (For simplicity’s sake, I focus on attitudes in what follows.) If 
Elliot believes that it is snowing in Michigan and that he lives in Michigan, he might on those 
grounds believe that it is snowing where he lives. Similarly, if Holly believes that it is 
snowing where she lives, she might on that basis decide to put on warm clothes. Again, if 
Stanley believes that a rabid dog is behind the door, he might for that reason fear opening it. 
                                                           
6 For critical discussion of the suggestion that the conditions which have to be met for testimony to provide 
knowledge concerning non-aesthetic matters are not met in the aesthetic case, see Hopkins, ‘Beauty and 
Testimony’; Pettit, ‘The Possibility of Aesthetic Realism’. 6 
 
Finally, if Hayley believes that Kelly ran a marathon in under three hours, she might on that 
basis admire Kelly. 
  Of course, the examples are underdescribed, but it should be uncontroversial that 
one’s beliefs constitute a basis for further cognitive, conative, and affective attitudes.7  
Belief plays this role in two ways – one causal, the other normative. First, belief 
motivates certain attitudes. The thought that a rabid dog is behind the door is what leads 
Stanley to fear opening it.  
Second, what a subject believes rationalizes certain attitudes. Given his belief that a 
rabid dog is behind the door, Stanley’s fear is rational.  
What does it take for a belief to rationalize an attitude? That is a large and thorny 
issue which I cannot resolve here. Nonetheless, I will say a few things so as to put some flesh 
on the proposal, all of which are supposed to be relatively uncontentious and commonplace in 
the literature. Later I address concerns one might have about it (§8).8 
A subject’s attitude is rational to the extent that, in light of what she believes, her 
attitude is right, or appropriate, or fitting, or correct, etc.9 Relative to his belief that there is a 
rabid dog behind the door, Stanley’s fear of opening it is fitting; hence, it is rational. Were he 
to believe instead that there is a gentle puppy behind the door, Stanley’s fear would not be 
fitting; hence, it would not be rational. 
Whether a belief rationalizes an attitude depends on what else the subject believes. 
Stanley’s belief that there is a rabid dog behind the door does not make it rational for him to 
                                                           
7 The claim is not that belief is the only basis for attitudes but that it is a basis for attitudes and, in some cases, 
the basis. This is consistent with the claim that in other cases something else – for example, perception – might 
figure in or provide that basis. 
8 In closing (§11), I introduce a more substantive – hence, more controversial – proposal for how beliefs 
rationalize further attitudes but, as I make clear there, the arguments to follow do not depend on it. 
9 Relative, if you like, to her goals or desires. 7 
 
fear opening it if he also believes that the dog is caged or sedated. When claiming that a 
subject’s belief makes it rational for her to have a certain attitude, I assume that beliefs which 
would outweigh or undercut the rationality of having that attitude are absent. 
Moreover, a belief does not make it rational to have a certain attitude unless that 
belief is itself rational. If Stanley’s belief that there is a rabid dog behind the door is a result 
of crazed conviction or held in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, it does not 
make it rational for him to fear opening it. In a slogan: irrationality cannot beget rationality. 
  To summarize, a subject’s belief makes it rational to hold some attitude only if the 
attitude is fitting (right, proper, etc.) relative to that belief, she has no further beliefs which 
defeat the rationality of holding that attitude, and the relevant belief is itself rational. One 
might think that these conditions are sufficient as well as necessary for the belief to 
rationalize the attitude it motivates but the argument to follow does not rest on this (cf. §6). 
No doubt these conditions could be spelled out more fully but, again, my aim is not to offer a 
detailed analysis of rationality but to introduce the materials needed for the case against 
optimism. 
   
4  Against Optimism    
As stressed, the above remarks on belief’s role in motivating and rationalizing attitudes are 
intended as uncontroversial and familiar. I now bring them to bear on the issue at hand. 
In general, beliefs acquired from bare testimony can motivate and rationalize further 
attitudes. Suppose that Holly turns on the radio to hear that it is snowing. She thereby comes 
to believe that it is snowing, which moves her to decide to put on warm clothes. This decision 
seems rational, which suggests that the belief on which it is based, a result of testimony, is 
also rational. Suppose that a neighbour tells Stanley that there is a rabid dog behind the door. 
He thereby comes to believe that there is a rabid dog behind the door, which in turn moves 8 
 
him to fear opening it. This fear seems rational, which suggests that the belief on which it is 
based, a result of testimony, is also rational. Finally, suppose that Dave phones Hayley to tell 
her that Kelly ran a marathon in under three hours. She thereby comes to believe that Kelly 
ran a marathon, which in turn moves her to admire Kelly. Hayley’s admiration seems 
rational, which suggests that the belief on which it is based, due to testimony, is also 
rational.10 
  The situation is different when one turns to beliefs about aesthetic matters. Suppose 
that a friend tells Harry that Rembrandt’s Abraham’s Sacrifice (1635) is good. As a result, 
Harry comes to believe that the painting is good, which moves him to admire it. In this case, 
it does not seem rational for Harry to admire the Rembrandt, which suggests that the belief on 
which it is based, a result of testimony, is not rational. If a belief is not rational, it is not 
knowledge. Hence, the belief Harry acquires via aesthetic testimony falls short of 
knowledge.11 
  Admittedly, I appeal to (so-called) intuition when suggesting that Harry’s admiration 
for the painting is not rational, in contrast to Hayley’s admiration for Kelly. But experience 
suggests that this intuition is shared much more widely than the intuition that subjects cannot 
acquire aesthetic knowledge via testimony. So, at the very least it provides a neutral starting-
point or some common ground from which the argument can proceed.  
To bolster the intuition, suppose that you learn that Harry admires the Rembrandt. 
You ask him why. He tells you that he admires it because the painting is good. You ask Harry 
                                                           
10 Since the testimony in each case is bare, Stanley is not told why the dog is rabid, in virtue of what it is rabid, 
etc., while Hayley is not told in what way Kelly ran the marathon, what made it the case that she did so, etc. 
11 One might agree that Harry’s admiration in the above case is in some way inappropriate, unfitting, or 
improper, but not want to say that it is thereby irrational. Fortunately, all the argument requires is the thought 
that Harry’s admiration is improper (etc.). It seems to me that ‘irrationality’ is the right term of criticism to 
apply in this case but nothing substantive turns on this. I return to this in §8. 9 
 
why he thinks this. He tells you that he thinks this because his friend told him that it is good. 
You persevere and ask in what respects the painting is good. Harry admits he has no idea. 
Surely, you would doubt that Harry’s admiration has an adequate basis, that it is rational. 
The claim here is not that, for his admiration to be rational, Harry must be able to 
articulate the features in virtue of which the painting is good. Often, we are not in a position 
to do this (without the help of, say, a critic). But where the subject is unable to make such 
things explicit there are typically things she can say, such as ‘You just have to see it!’ or 
‘That is good!’ (directing our attention to a feature of the painting). Evidently, these are not 
things one can say in cases where admiration is grounded in bare testimony. 
Note how the case just described differs from cases of admiration based on non-
aesthetic testimony. Suppose that you learn that Hayley admires Kelly. You ask her why. She 
tells you that Kelly ran a marathon. You ask Hayley why she thinks this. She tells you that 
she believes it because Dave told her as much. You might be satisfied with this reply. You 
need not doubt that Hayley’s’ admiration is rational. 
  Compare also a case in which Harry acquires the belief that Abraham’s Sacrifice is 
good in some other way than from bare testimony. Suppose that Harry sees the painting and 
notices the playing-card-like structure in which the grey, worn face of Abraham and his 
heavy hands are mirrored by the angel’s smooth, flushed face and weightless hands, that 
Harry follows the sweeping line from the angel’s billowing sleeve along the curved blade of 
the knife – seemingly frozen in mid-air – to the radiant skin of Isaac’s neck, and so on. As a 
result of what he sees, Harry believes that the painting is good.12 This moves him to admire 
                                                           
12 The claim here is that perceptual acquaintance with the object can provide rational support for an aesthetic 
belief, not that aesthetic beliefs are only rational when acquired on the basis of such acquaintance. 10 
 
the work.13 In this case, the admiration seems rational, which suggests that the belief on 
which it is based, acquired in a non-testimonial fashion, is also rational. If it is rational, it is a 
candidate for knowledge. 
  The claim that an affective attitude based on an aesthetic belief due to bare testimony 
is not rational does not turn on the particular example. Suppose that a colleague tells Sophie 
that the Shard is ugly. As a result, she comes to believe that it is ugly, which in turn moves 
her to disapprove of the building. It does not seem rational for Sophie to feel disapproval 
toward the Shard, which suggests that the belief on which it is based, a result of testimony, is 
not rational. If a belief is not rational, it is not knowledge. Hence, the aesthetic belief Sophie 
acquires via testimony falls short of knowledge. 
  Suppose that Mike’s cousin tells him that a certain performance of Bach’s Air on the 
G String is beautiful. As a result, Mike comes to believe that the performance is beautiful, 
which moves him to feel esteem toward the performance. It does not seem rational for Mike 
to esteem the performance, which suggests that the belief on which it is based, a result of 
testimony, is not rational. If a belief is not rational, it is not knowledge. Hence, the aesthetic 
belief Mike acquires via testimony falls short of knowledge.14  
   Insofar as there is nothing special about the examples, one can generalize from them. 
An affect based on an aesthetic belief based on bare testimony is not rational. Hence, an 
aesthetic belief based on bare testimony is not rational. Hence, an aesthetic belief based on 
bare testimony does not qualify as knowledge. 
                                                           
13 I am not suggesting that Harry’s admiration must be based on his non-testimonial belief that the painting is 
good – it might be based directly on what he perceives, or on his beliefs about the features of the painting in 
virtue of which it is good. 
14 As these examples reveal, I do not assume that beliefs acquired due to aesthetic testimony give rise to a 
distinctive aesthetic attitude characterized, perhaps, by a peculiar form of disinterest. I consider only cases 
involving common-or-garden affects. 11 
 
  This is a stronger conclusion than one might have expected. The claim is not merely 
that testimony is not a source of aesthetic knowledge but that it is not even a source of 
rational aesthetic belief. Optimism must be false. 
 
5  Alternative Explanations  
I claimed that a belief rationalizes an attitude only if it is rational. Next, I claimed that 
aesthetic beliefs due to bare testimony do not rationalize certain attitudes. I concluded that 
those beliefs are not rational. Am I committing the fallacy of denying the antecedent? 
  No. The argument is intended as one to the best explanation. In that case, however, 
one might wonder whether a better explanation is available for why the relevant beliefs fail to 
rationalize the associated attitudes.  
  A rational belief might not rationalize an attitude if certain other beliefs are present 
which defeat the rationality of having that attitude. But I have stipulated that, in the above 
cases, such further beliefs are absent.  
If a belief is rational, it does not follow that it rationalizes all and any attitudes. A 
rational belief that there is a gentle puppy behind a door does not rationalize fear of opening 
it. What is believed must stand in a suitable (rationalizing) relationship to the relevant 
attitudes. Perhaps the aesthetic beliefs acquired via bare testimony are rational but do not 
stand in the relevant relationship to the attitudes in question. 
As it happens, I think that there is something to this thought. But, as stated, it is 
extremely puzzling. What could stand in a better rationalizing relation to admiration than the 
belief that something is good? If, as Harry believes, the Rembrandt is good, admiration is 
surely fitting (right, appropriate, etc.). So, if there is a reason why this belief fails to 
rationalize admiration, it is hard to see how it could be that its content does not bear in the 
relevant way on the attitude it motivates.  12 
 
I will return to the above thought in closing (§11) and suggest that, rather than 
undermining the argument, it actually supports it by contributing to an explanation for why 
the pessimistic conclusion holds.  
  One might be tempted to seek an explanation for why affective attitudes based only 
on aesthetic beliefs due to testimony are not rational in constraints governing the affects. 
Perhaps an affective attitude is rational only if the subject has first-hand experience (broadly 
construed) of the object of that attitude. Since, in the original case, Harry has not seen 
Abraham’s Sacrifice for himself, his admiration is not rational. The problem does not lie with 
Harry’s belief that the painting is good – which might be rational, and thus knowledge – but 
is peculiar to the admiration it gives rise to. 
The principle that an affect is rational only if a subject has experience of its object 
does not seem to hold generally. If Stanley is told that a rabid dog is behind the door, he 
might come to believe this and, on that basis alone, fear what lies behind the door. This fear 
might be rational, even though Stanley has not experienced the dog for himself. Likewise, if 
Hayley is told that Kelly ran a marathon, she might come to believe this and, on that basis 
alone, admire Kelly in this regard. This admiration might be rational, even though Hayley did 
not see, hear, or otherwise perceive Kelly’s performance.  
That said, for the purposes of this paper, I can accept the proposed principle of 
acquaintance. If it holds, one would expect it to apply to aesthetic beliefs too, not just the 
affects they cause. After all, if it is rational for Harry to believe that the Rembrandt is good 
despite not having experienced it, it is hard to see why it would not be equally rational for 
him to admire it. Conversely, if it is irrational to admire the painting, having not seen it, it 
would be surprising if it were not also irrational to think well of it.  13 
 
  The point here is that it is highly implausible to suggest that a requirement of first-
hand experience governs the affects but not the corresponding beliefs.15 And, if a version of 
that requirement applies to aesthetic beliefs, pessimism follows.16 
One might suggest that, even if a subject holds an attitude on the basis of a rational 
belief, she has no defeating beliefs, and the content of her belief stands in a suitable 
(rationalizing) relation to the relevant attitude, her belief might still fail to rationalize her 
attitude, since it fails to satisfy further conditions. What might those conditions be? 
Some claim that what one believes provides a rational basis for an act or attitude only 
if one knows what one believes.17 Clearly, this provides no support to optimism. Some deny 
that knowledge, hence rational belief, is always a rational basis for a corresponding act or 
attitude – in some cases only certain knowledge will do. This is plausible in ‘high-stakes’ 
cases like the following. Katy’s children have been kidnapped and she needs to secure the 
ransom money within an hour. She knows that a certain bank is open. But it would be 
irrational for her to decide to go to the bank on the basis of that belief until she has made sure 
that it is (by phoning, checking online, and so on).18 
  So, if it is irrational for Harry to disapprove of the Rembrandt on the basis of his 
testimonial belief, it might not follow that his belief falls short of knowledge – perhaps it falls 
short of certainty. Since the optimist claims only that testimony can deliver aesthetic 
knowledge, not certainty, such a case is not a counterexample to the view. 
                                                           
15 This is especially counterintuitive if, as many hold, the claim that something is good is or entails the claim 
that there are reasons to adopt a favourable attitude (such as admiration) toward it. I return to this idea in closing 
(§11). 
16 Cf. Budd, ‘The Acquaintance Principle’. 
17 John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley ‘Knowledge and Action’, Journal of Philosophy 105 (2008), 571-590. 
18 Cf. Jessica Brown, ‘Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning’, Noûs 
42 (2008), 167-189. 14 
 
  While one might accept that it is sometimes irrational to hold an attitude on the basis 
of less than certain knowledge, it is surely sometimes, indeed often, rational to do so. If Holly 
knows that it is snowing and the stakes are low, it is rational for her to decide to put on warm 
clothes whether or not she is certain of the weather. In contrast, it is never rational for Harry 
to admire the Rembrandt on the basis of a belief that it is good acquired though bare 
testimony, even when the stakes are low. Indeed, I can simply stipulate that in the cases I 
discuss little to nothing is at stake. 
I cannot promise to have considered all possible alternative explanations to the one I 
have offered for why beliefs acquired due to bare aesthetic testimony fail to rationalize 
affective attitudes. But I do think I have addressed the foremost contenders, as well as the 
prominent positions in the literature, and it is not obvious what options, if any, remain. In the 
absence of an alternative, the best explanation remains that the belief in question is not 
rational. 
I turn now from the search for competing explanations to challenges of a different sort 
to my argument for pessimism. 
 
6  Conative Attitudes 
One might object to the case against optimism on the grounds that it rests on a one-sided diet 
of examples. An aesthetic belief acquired via bare testimony might not rationalize admiration 
and the like – affective attitudes – but it might rationalize desire and the like – conative 
attitudes. If a friend tells Harry that the Rembrandt is good, this might lead him to want to see 
it. This attitude seems rational. Hence, the belief acquired via testimony motivating the 
attitude must be rational. 
  I deny this. If a subject really holds a conative attitude on the basis of a belief 
acquired due to bare testimony (alone), her attitude is not rational. This might seem crazy – 15 
 
surely we frequently want to see things on the basis of reports we receive and are rational for 
doing so. Indeed, one might ask, isn’t one of the main points of reading reviews of artworks 
to inform our desires about what to watch (or listen to, etc.)? 
  It is important to stress that to deny that it is rational for a subject like Harry in the 
above case to desire to see the painting is not to deny that there are cases in which it is 
rational to form a conative attitude in response to, say, reading a review. Consider a revised 
case in which what motivates and rationalizes Harry’s desire is not a belief that the painting 
is good but a belief that his friend thinks that the painting is good. Such a non-aesthetic, 
psychological belief might be rational but, as noted (§2), that is not to concede that the 
testimony-based, aesthetic belief is rational. Or consider a case in which what motivates and 
rationalizes Harry’s desire is a belief that the painting is probably good. Such a 
(probabilistic) belief might be rational but, as noted (§2), that is not to concede that its non-
probabilistic counterpart is rational. 
  In a similar fashion, when a person (in real life) decides to watch Harold and Maude 
having read a favourable review in Sight and Sound, I venture that the operative belief has 
psychological or probabilistic content, not non-probabilistic aesthetic content.19 After all, 
when a person is asked why she wants to see a film she has read about, a typical response is, 
‘Because it’s supposed to be good’ or ‘Because Sight and Sound says that it’s good’, not 
simply, ‘Because it’s good’. It might seem I am indulging in armchair psychological 
speculation. But the present point does not depend on it. What matters is that, in cases of bare 
testimony, there are other attitudes available to motivate a subject to hold a conative attitude 
                                                           
19 It is worth noting that typically reviews do not just state that a work is good (or bad); they provide information 
about the features of the work that make it good (or bad). In that case, they do not provide bare testimony.  16 
 
than a (non-probabilistic) aesthetic belief and, if the attitude is held on that basis, nothing I 
have said here implies that it is irrational.20 
So, to claim that it is not rational for Harry to desire to see the Rembrandt on the basis 
of a belief that it is good acquired via bare testimony alone is not to suggest that it is 
impossible for a conative attitude held in some other way as a result of testimony to be 
rational, let alone to cast aspersions on our everyday habits of consuming reviews. However, 
I have not yet said anything in support of the relevant claim. I find it simply intuitive that a 
desire to see a work grounded only in a belief that it is good grounded only in bare testimony 
is not rational. But, if that intuition is not shared by or as strong in others, consider the 
following. 
Suppose that an aesthetic belief acquired via bare testimony can rationalize a conative 
attitude. In that case, the aesthetic belief must itself be rational. In that case, in turn, it should 
be capable of rationalizing further attitudes, including affects. But, as shown above, it is not 
so capable.  
To bolster this line of thought, note that it seems generally to be the case that, if a 
belief can provide rational support for one kind of attitude, it can provide rational support for 
another kind of attitude. Stanley’s belief that there is a rabid dog behind the door can 
rationalize his fear of opening it and a corresponding desire not to do so. Hayley’s belief that 
Kelly ran a marathon can rationalize her admiration for Kelly and a corresponding desire to 
congratulation her. 
This is reflected in the use we make of our beliefs in deliberation. When reasoning, 
we do not ‘segregate’ our beliefs into those which support theoretical conclusions, those 
which support practical conclusions, those which support affective responses, and so on. If 
Stanley believes that a rabid dog is behind the door, it would be very odd (to say the least) for 
                                                           
20 For a similar point, from an optimist, see Meskin, ‘Aesthetic Testimony’, 71-72. 17 
 
him to treat this as a premise in his reasoning as to whether to decide to open it, but then to 
put the thought to one side when thinking about whether his fear of doing so has any basis. 
This accords with the idea that the kinds of considerations which can rationalize one kind of 
attitude, say, conative, are the very same considerations which can rationalize another kind of 
attitude, say, affective.21 
To pursue the issue further, suppose that Harry’s testimonial belief that the 
Rembrandt is good makes it rational for him to want to see it but not to admire it. What could 
explain this? Perhaps Harry has beliefs which defeat the rationality of admiring the painting 
but not the desire to see it. But I stipulated that he has no such beliefs. Perhaps the belief 
stands in the rationalizing relation to the desire but not to the affect. But, as seen above, it is 
hard to see how that relation could fail to hold between his belief and his admiration for it. 
Perhaps there is more at stake for Harry in admiring the painting than in desiring to see it. But 
I stipulated that the stakes are low. So, assuming Harry’s belief makes rational his desire, I 
am at a loss to see what prevents it from making rational his admiration. Since it does not 
rationalize his admiration, we should reject the assumption that it rationalizes his desire.22 
                                                           
21 Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath develop a ‘segregation’ argument along these lines, though in a different 
context and in support of a different point, in Knowledge in an Uncertain World (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 73ff. 
22 Suppose that Harry is told that Rembrandt’s paintings are good. One might think that it is rational for him on 
that basis to admire Rembrandt (as opposed to his works). But if the belief that Rembrandt’s paintings are good 
is not rational, as I claim, it cannot rationalize admiration for Rembrandt.  
  Unsurprisingly, perhaps, I deny that it is rational for Harry to admire Rembrandt on the basis of a bare 
aesthetic belief acquired due to such testimony (alone).  To support this, I could rehearse the arguments from 
this section. For example, if the belief that Rembrandt’s paintings are good rationalizes one attitude, namely, 
admiration for Rembrandt, it must be capable of rationalizing another, namely, admiration for his paintings. 
Moreover, for all I say here, there might be other beliefs acquired in response to the testimony which could 
rationalize admiration of Rembrandt, for example, the belief that the critics think that his paintings are good, or 
that he won them over. 18 
 
 
7  Impossible Attitudes 
One might argue that it is impossible to hold an affective attitude toward something on the 
basis of a belief acquired via bare aesthetic testimony alone.23 If it is impossible to have such 
an attitude on such a basis, it is impossible for an attitude held on that basis to be irrational or 
otherwise. Hence, the argument against optimism is unsuccessful. 
  Why think that it is impossible to feel admiration for a painting on the basis of bare 
testimony? One might suggest that it is in the nature of such an attitude to be directed toward 
features of the work. Alternatively, the object of favour is the work’s properties. Since bare 
testimony does not convey information about the work’s features or properties, it is 
impossible to have that attitude on its basis. 
  But surely goodness is a property of a work. In that case, bare testimony does make it 
possible to have the relevant attitude. 
  In response, the proponent of this objection might insist that an affect like admiration 
is directed, not at the goodness of the painting as such, but at the particular way in which it is 
good. Since bare testimony provides no information about the way in which the work is good, 
it does not provide admiration with its object. Hence, it is impossible to admire a work on the 
basis of a belief acquired due to bare testimony. 
  Suppose, however, that Harry’s friend tells him that there is a particular way in which 
the Rembrandt is good. Harry might come to believe that the painting is good in that way, 
that is, in the way his friend refers to. In that case, it should be possible for Harry to admire 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Analogous points apply to the suggestion that, though a belief like Harry’s cannot rationalize affective 
or conative attitudes, it can rationalize further cognitive attitudes. 
23 Cf. ‘Attitudes and reactions linked to appreciation – liking or disliking, admiration, contempt, revulsion, and 
so on – are denied to you [in testimonial cases]: you cannot like a work’s gracefulness if you are unacquainted 
with the work’ (Budd, ‘The Acquaintance Principle’, 392).  19 
 
the work, where his admiration is directed toward that way in which the work is good. Still, 
such admiration would not be rational. Hence, the belief on which it is based, due to bare 
testimony, is not rational either.  
Moreover, it is false that affects in general are directed, not at something’s features, 
aesthetic or otherwise, but at ways in which it manifests those features. If Stanley is told 
(only) that a certain dog is rabid, he might come to believe that it is rabid and, on that basis, 
fear the dog’s rabidity. This seems possible, even though he knows nothing about the 
particular way in which the dog is rabid. 
Alternatively, the person claiming that it is impossible to have an affective attitude on 
the basis of a belief acquired due to bare testimony might insist that an attitude of admiration 
is directed, not toward goodness or any other aesthetic feature, but toward the non-aesthetic 
features of the work in virtue of which it is good. Alternatively, the object of admiration is 
the work’s non-aesthetic properties. Since bare testimony does not provide information about 
such properties, it is not possible to have the relevant attitude on its basis. 
  This is a controversial claim. The onus is on the proponent of the objection to provide 
some evidence in its support. Certainly appearances do not support it. It is perfectly 
legitimate to talk of admiring the beauty of a performance, of approving of how good a 
painting is, and so on.  
Moreover, if the claim has any plausibility with respect to the affective attitudes, it 
has none whatsoever with respect to the conative attitudes. It is confused to suggest that the 
object of desire must be, or could be, the features of the work in virtue of which it is good – it 
is not even clear what it would mean to say that Harry wants the painting’s sweeping lines. 
What Harry might want is to see the painting or to examine its sweeping lines. Since an 
attitude like this is not directed toward a work’s features, that is, since it does not take those 20 
 
features as its object, the fact that bare testimony provides no information about a work’s 
non-aesthetic features does not prevent a subject from forming such an attitude on its basis. 
  So, there is little reason yet to think it impossible to be moved to an affective attitude 
by a belief acquired through bare aesthetic testimony, and none at all to think it impossible to 
be moved to a conative attitude in this way. Thus, there is no reason yet to take the objection 
to the argument seriously. 
 
8  Rationality 
Throughout I have made claims about the rationality of attitudes and the beliefs on which 
they are based. I suggested earlier that whether an attitude based on a belief is rational 
depends in part on whether that attitude is right (fitting, appropriate, etc.) in light of that 
belief. This might seem okay if one understands rationality in something like the following 
way: 
When we call some act [or attitude] ‘rational’, using this word in its ordinary, non-technical 
sense, we express the kind of praise or approval that we can also express with words like 
‘sensible’, ‘reasonable’, ‘intelligent’, and ‘smart’. We use the word ‘irrational’ to express the 
kind of criticism that we express with words like ‘senseless’, ‘stupid’, ‘idiotic’, and ‘crazy’.24 
If Stanley believes that a gentle puppy is behind the door, it is stupid (senseless, etc.) for him 
to fear opening it. 
  Not everyone accepts this conception of rationality. Some suggest that it is rational for 
a person to have an attitude just in case it is consistent with other attitudes she holds or with 
her beliefs about the attitudes she ought to have.25 In view of this, one might worry that my 
argument turns on a controversial conception of rationality. 
                                                           
24 Derek Parfit, On What Matters: Volume I (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 33. 
25 Cf. John Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013); T. M. Scanlon, What We 
Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). 21 
 
The debate over what makes an attitude rational is not one I can resolve in this paper. 
Fortunately, for present purposes, I do not need to do so. The argument could be run without 
talking in terms of rationality at all but only in terms of when it is sensible (reasonable, etc.) 
or otherwise to hold a certain an attitude. It is silly (senseless, etc.) for Harry to admire the 
Rembrandt on the basis of a belief acquired due to bare aesthetic testimony. This suggests 
that it is silly for him to have that belief. And one cannot know that p if it is silly to believe 
that p.  
So, while I am sympathetic to the above conception of rationality, the argument 
against optimism does not depend on it. Having made this point, I revert to talk of rationality. 
 
9  Baring All 
I suggested that an aesthetic belief due to bare testimony cannot rationalize affective or 
conative attitudes and that the best explanation of this is that the belief is not rational. If it is 
not rational, it is not knowledge. So, aesthetic knowledge due to bare testimony is not 
possible. 
I focused on a narrow range of cases in support of this argument, cases of bare 
testimony. One might wonder, then, if the problem lies not so much with the testimony as 
with its bareness. Perhaps a bare aesthetic belief that a Rembrandt is good, whether acquired 
via testimony or in some other way, cannot rationalize admiration for that work. In that case, 
one might think, arguments parallel to those I gave above would suggest that that belief is not 
itself rational, hence, not a candidate for knowledge. More generally, perhaps bare aesthetic 
knowledge is simply not possible, and focusing on the particular case of testimony serves 
merely to bring this to light. 22 
 
  If that is right, and I allow that it is, it is grist to the mill. After all, if bare aesthetic 
knowledge is not possible, it follows immediately that bare aesthetic testimony cannot 
provide it.26 
It is important to note, however, that to allow that the belief that a Rembrandt is good 
cannot rationalize admiration for it when bare is not to allow that that belief cannot 
rationalize admiration when clothed, that is, when accompanied by further non-aesthetic 
beliefs about the respects in which the painting is good, or about the features which realize its 
goodness, and so on.27  
If no belief that a painting is good can rationalize admiration for it, whether bare or 
clothed, arguments parallel to those I gave above might suggest that no such belief can 
amount to knowledge! While this claim is consistent with my argument – and, of course, 
provides a straightforward explanation for why testimony is not a source of aesthetic 
knowledge – it is not one I want to endorse (cf. §2). 
Fortunately, I do not have to do so. While the argument of this paper does not depend 
on it, there is a story to tell, one which is consistent with what I say above, for how the belief 
that a Rembrandt is good might, when clothed, rationalize admiration for the painting, hence, 
for how such a belief might be a candidate for knowledge. 
As noted earlier (§3), whether a subject’s belief rationalizes further attitudes depends 
on what else she believes. Suppose that Stanley fears opening the door on the basis of his 
belief that a gentle puppy is behind it. Considered on its own, the belief might seem not to 
rationalize the fear. But suppose that Stanley also believes that the puppy’s rabid companion 
                                                           
26 In closing (§11), I will introduce some ideas which bolster this point. 
27 Or when it is accompanied by perceptual experiences (as) of the respects in which the painting is good or the 
features which realize its goodness. Compare the revised case in §4 in which Harry’s perceptually-based belief 
that the Rembrandt is good rationalizes his admiration for it. 23 
 
invariably accompanies it. Given this additional background belief, Stanley’s belief that a 
gentle puppy is behind the door might rationalize the fear it gives rise to.28 Likewise, suppose 
that Harry admires Abraham’s Sacrifice on the basis of his belief that it is good. Considered 
on its own, the belief might seem not to rationalize his admiration. But suppose that Harry 
also has beliefs about the non-aesthetic features of the work which make it good, or the 
respects in which it is good. Given such additional background beliefs, Harry’s belief that the 
Rembrandt is good might rationalize the admiration it gives rise to. Hence, the arguments 
above allow that, when accompanied or clothed in this way, the belief that a painting is good 
might itself be rational and (so) knowledge. 
In light of the above, it is worth asking whether testimony could be a source of 
aesthetic knowledge when it is not bare. Suppose that, in addition to or instead of claiming 
that Abraham’s Sacrifice is good, Harry’s friend conveys information about the features in 
virtue of which it is good, about the respects in which it is good, and so on. Might Harry 
come to know, on that basis, that the painting is good? 
  Perhaps knowledge of some of these features can only be conveyed via the use of 
perceptually-based demonstratives. That would depend on the individual case. Otherwise, I 
see no reason to deny that testimony of this sort might provide knowledge of a sort in a 
fashion. But note that it does so by providing non-aesthetic knowledge, specifically, 
knowledge of the non-aesthetic properties in virtue of which something possesses aesthetic 
properties. If the testimony in question is not bare, by the same token it is not really, or not 
merely, aesthetic. So, to grant that such testimony provides knowledge is not to concede 
                                                           
28 Instead of saying that, given the background belief, Stanley’s belief that a gentle puppy is behind the door 
rationalizes his fear, one might prefer to say that it is the set containing both beliefs which rationalizes his fear. 
This makes no difference to what follows. 24 
 
ground to the optimist. It is not in dispute that testimony can be a source of non-aesthetic 
knowledge, which might in turn deliver aesthetic knowledge. 
 
10  In the Thick of It 
Suppose that we lift the restriction to testimony involving only thin evaluative concepts, such 
as beauty and goodness, and consider cases in which the testifier makes a claim involving a 
thick concept, such as that Wim Wenders’ Paris, Texas is cool, that Southampton architecture 
is brutal, that the Shostakovich jazz suites are delightful, and so on. As noted above, what, if 
anything, makes for a thick concept is a controversial matter, which I cannot adequately 
address here.29 Nonetheless, I will offer some remarks about the bearing of my argument on 
the debate concerning thick concepts. 
  Consider an aesthetic analogue of a Hare-style analysis of thick moral concepts.30 
According to it, a thick concept involves a purely descriptive component and a separable thin 
evaluative component. On this view, to say that something is delightful is to say that it 
possesses such-and-such descriptive properties and is good (or beautiful) for doing so. If an 
analysis of thick concepts of this form is correct, aesthetic testimony involving a claim in 
which a thick concept figures is not really bare. The testifier not only claims of the work that 
it is good but in addition conveys information about the non-aesthetic properties it possesses 
which make it good. Hence, it is consistent with my argument that, in such cases, the hearer 
might acquire testimonial knowledge that a work is delightful. Once again, to admit this is 
not to concede ground to the optimist. It is not in dispute that testimony can be a source of 
non-aesthetic knowledge, which might in turn deliver aesthetic knowledge. 
                                                           
29 For an overview of the debate, see Debbie Roberts, ‘Thick Concepts’, Philosophy Compass 8 (2013), 677-
688. 
30 See R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: OUP, 1963). 25 
 
  Interestingly, however, the considerations I appealed to in arguing against optimism 
with respect to cases of testimony involving thin concepts appear equally to show that one 
cannot acquire knowledge via testimony involving (some) thick concepts. Suppose that 
Alex’s friend tells her that a Shostakovich jazz suite is delightful. As a result, Alex comes to 
believe that the piece is delightful. This moves her to feel delight toward the jazz suite. In this 
case, it does not seem rational for Alex to be delighted, which suggests that the belief on 
which her attitude is based, a result of testimony, is not rational. If a belief is not rational, it is 
not knowledge. Hence, the belief Alex acquires via aesthetic testimony falls short of 
knowledge. 
  Suppose that Dave tells Kelly that a Haneke film is shocking. As a result, Kelly 
comes to believe that the film is shocking. This moves her to feel shock toward the film. In 
this case, it does not seem rational for Kelly to feel shock, which suggests that the belief on 
which her attitude is based, a result of testimony, is not rational. If a belief is not rational, it is 
not knowledge. Hence, the belief Kelly acquires via aesthetic testimony falls short of 
knowledge. 
In support and defence of these lines of thought, one can rehearse the points made in 
previous sections. 
  So, my argument against optimism, if successful, seems also to cast doubt on a Hare-
style analysis of thick concepts. Of course, there are more sophisticated analyses of thick 
concepts in non-evaluative and thin terms available. It is not my aim here to assess all such 
alternatives, or compare them critically with views according to which thick concepts are 
wholly evaluative or wholly non-evaluative. My aim has only been to indicate how my 
argument against optimism might bear on the debate concerning those views. 
 
11  Concluding Remarks 26 
 
At the outset, I suggested that we can settle the dispute between optimists and pessimists 
concerning aesthetic testimony by turning attention away from the basis for the belief in 
question – testimony – and toward what that belief might provide a basis for – other attitudes. 
This led to an argument against optimism, according to which the fact that an aesthetic belief 
due to bare testimony cannot make it rational to have an affective or conative attitude shows 
that the belief falls short of knowledge, indeed, that it is not rational. 
  It would be interesting and worthwhile to explore why aesthetic knowledge is not 
possible due to testimony of the sort I have considered. Since one can acquire testimonial 
knowledge about meteorological matters, what could explain the fact that one cannot acquire 
testimonial knowledge about aesthetic matters? While it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
provide, let alone defend, a full answer to this question, I will close by indicating what I think 
such an explanation might look like. It would be easier to accept the pessimist conclusion, 
one might think, if one had some idea of how it could be true.31  
  To start with, consider a suggestion from Scanlon: 
Being valuable is not a property that provides us with reasons. Rather, to call something 
valuable is to say that it has other properties that provide reasons for behaving in certain ways 
with regard to it.32  
Applied to the aesthetic domain, the suggestion is that to claim or believe that an object is 
good or beautiful is to claim or believe that that there is a reason for, say, admiring it but, 
                                                           
31 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal for urging me to address this point. 
32 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 96. Scanlon’s suggestion is associated with the so-called buck-passing 
analysis of value, according to which the evaluative can be analysed in terms of the deontic, specifically, in 
terms of reasons for affective attitudes. The explanation to follow is not committed to such an analysis; it 
requires only the claim that facts about value are not reasons for attitudes but rather entail the existence of such 
reasons. An opponent of buck-passing could accept this. 27 
 
importantly, it is not to make a claim or have a belief about what that reason is, or about the 
features which provide it.  
  Next, consider a suggestion from Parfit: 
We are rational insofar as we respond well to reasons, or apparent reasons. We have some 
apparent reason when we have beliefs about the relevant facts whose truth would give us 
some reason.33 
Applied to the aesthetic domain, the suggestion is that what one believes makes it rational for 
one to admire an object, say, just in case what one believes would be (or provide) a reason for 
admiring it were it to be true. 
  Finally, consider the suggestion that, if it is to some degree rational to believe that 
there is a reason for you to hold some attitude, it is to some degree rational to hold that 
attitude.34 Applied to the aesthetic domain, the suggestion is that, if it is in no way reasonable 
(sensible, smart, etc.) to admire an object, it cannot be in any way reasonable (etc.) to think 
that there is a reason to admire it. After all, whatever would make the belief reasonable would 
surely make the corresponding attitude to some degree reasonable.  
  Needless to say, each of the suggestions above requires further discussion and 
defence. My aim here is only to show that, if true, they together explain why bare testimony 
                                                           
33 Parfit, On What Matters, 5. I consider in detail and defend a version of this proposal in ‘Keep Things in 
Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori’, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (2014), 1-22. 
34 Many philosophers make the related claim that if it is to rational (overall) for you to believe that there is 
conclusive reason for you to φ, or to believe that you ought to φ, it is to rational (overall) for you to φ. See, for 
example, John Brunero, ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2010), 28-49; John 
Gibbons, ‘You Gotta Do What You Gotta Do’, Noûs 43 (2009), 157-177; and Jonathan Way, Journal of Ethics 
and Social Philosophy (2009), 1-8.  28 
 
is not a source of aesthetic knowledge.35 Importantly, the above argument for pessimism is 
independent of that explanation – they do not stand or fall together. 
  Suppose that Harry’s friend tells him (only) that the Rembrandt is good and Harry 
comes as a result to believe (only) that it is good. According to the Scanlon-inspired 
suggestion, this is to believe that there is a reason for admiring the Rembrandt. Were what 
Harry believes true, it would not on its own be (or provide) such a reason. So, according to 
the Parfit-inspired suggestion, what Harry believes does not on its own make it rational for 
him to admire the Rembrandt. And, according to the final suggestion, if Harry’s belief does 
not on its own make it (at all) rational for him to admire the painting, his testimonially-
acquired belief is not itself rational. Hence, that belief is not knowledge. 
  The proposal, then, is that the explanation for why bare testimony cannot deliver 
aesthetic knowledge is to be found by reflecting, not on the nature of testimony, but on 
connections between values, reasons, and rationality.  
While each of the ideas introduced above is independently plausible, spelling out 
those ideas and how together they add up to an explanation for an otherwise puzzling 
phenomenon is a task for another occasion. The aim of this paper has been to show that, by 
reflecting on how a belief might motivate and rationalize further attitudes, one finds support 
for the conclusion that, when it comes to aesthetic testimony, one should expect the worst.36 
 
                                                           
35 If successful, the explanation shows that bare aesthetic knowledge of any sort is not possible. But I will here 
not consider how it might be generalized beyond the case of testimony. 
36 I am grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for funding which supported the writing of this 
paper (AH/K008188/1). For comments and discussion, thanks to Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, Guy Fletcher, 
Jon Robson, an anonymous referee for this journal, and members of audiences in Fribourg, Dublin, York, 
Cardiff, and Manchester. Special thanks to Aaron Ridley – my efforts to address his penetrating criticisms of an 
early version led to a very different (and, I hope, much better) paper. 29 
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